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Abstract 
This project aims to describe Pollard's rho-Algorithm for solving the Discrete Logarithm 
Problem in a group, and to look at how this algorithm applies to Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography. We start with a general definition of Elliptic Curves and the Discrete 
Logarithm Problem, and go on to describe Pollard's rho-algorithm in detail. We prove 
some of the assumptions used in the algorithm description, and in the final section we look 
at some of the issues with which one is faced when trying to apply the algorithm to the 
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem. 
1 
Introduction 
Cryptography is the study of making and breaking codes. A cryptosystem is a procedure 
for keeping information secure (for a formal definition of a cryptosystem, see [1] p71, 
Definition 3.1.1 ). In particular, this paper deals with public-key cryptosystems which are 
cryptosytems where only one person, say Alice, knows how to decrypt ciphertext 
(encrypted messages), but anyone can encrypt a plaintext (unencrypted message) using a 
public key published by Alice. The public key reveals no information about the private key 
that Alice uses to decrypt the ciphertext. 
This paper explores an algorithm for breaking a common type of cryptosystem. The first 
section looks at an example of a cryptosystem, and describes a method known as Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography. The second section looks at an algorithm called Pollard's rho-
algorithm, which can be used to break the cryptosystem; section three contains some 
proofs and remarks, while the final section looks at how we can apply this code-breaking 
algorithm to Elliptic Curve Cryptography. 
Section One: Elliptic Curves and the Discrete Logarithm 
Problem 
1.1 The Discrete Logarithm Problem 
Many public-key cryptosystems are based on the difficulty of what is known as the 
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). Suppose we have a prime p and a generator y for the 
group 7l/, that is, an element yEll/ such that the set {yr mod p 1 1 ~ r ~ p- 1} contains 
every non-zero element of llp*. The DLP is calculating the index x in the equation 
y"= a mod p (Eqn 1.1) 
for known y, p and oc A deterministic brute-force approach will always solve the problem, 
but for large p it is computationally impractical to calculate yr mod p for 1 ~ r ~ p - 1 and 
compare the result to the known <X. 
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Note that we refer to the DLP as calculating the index; there is only one possible element 
XE7l/ that satisfies Eqn 1.1. The generator y, by definition, generates every element of 
7lp*, and y is a generator if and only if IYI = 17l/l; therefore every element in 7l/ appears 
exactly once in the set {y' mod p 1 1 :::; r:::; p- 1 }, and there is only one possibility for x. 
1.2 Elliptic Curves 
Given some field F, an Elliptic Curve E(F) is the set of all solutions to an equation of the 
form 
(Eqn 1.2) 
together with a point oo not on the curve, where a,b,c,d E F, a#O, and the cubic in x has 
three distinct roots; that is, E(F) is the set {(.:r,x)c F x F I y2 = ax1+bx.2+cx·+d }U{co}. [3 pg4] 
When F=IR{, the curve has a graph that is symmetric about the x-axis as shown in Fig 1.3. 
6.-----~----------~~---x~----~-----, 
4 
2 
0 
-2 
-~s·L-----~------2~----~o~--~~2------4~--~6 
y2 = Xl + 5x2 + 5x + 5 
(Fig 1.3) 
3 
The points of an elliptic curve, together with a point oo not on the curve, form an abelian 
group under an operation known as the 'addition law', denoted by EEl. [3 pg11, Theorem 
3.2] . For an explanation (but no formal proof) of why this is true, see Garrett's text 
[2 Section 28.3, pg452]. This addition law can be described geometrically in the real 
number case from the graph. Let P = (x,y) be a point on the curve; then we define 
P' = (x, -y) to be its reflection in the x-axis. Taking two points P, Q on the curve, the third 
point R' = P rn Q is found as follows: drawing a straight line between P and Q, we take the 
third intersection of the line and the curve and call it R. Then P ffi Q is the reflection R' of R 
in the x-axis. At this point we can note that the group E(!ffi.) will be abelian by construction ; 
joining two points with a line is not affected by the order in which the points are presented . 
The proof of commutativity in the general case E(F) is beyond the scope of this research 
project. 
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There are some special cases: when P = oo, oo EEl Q = Q, and similarly when Q = oo, 
PEEl oo = P. When P = Q, we define PEEl Q = 2P as shown in Fig 1.5; we take the tangent 
line at the point P and find the second intersection between the line and the curve. Given 
the point P = (x,y), if y=O, 2P = 00 • 
1.3 Algebraic Description Of The Addition Law 
This description gives us an idea of how the addition law works, but it does not work when 
the elliptic curve is over a finite field. In this case the graph is not continuous (the graph is 
in fact just a finite set of points, symmetric about the x-axis) and drawing lines to intersect 
the curve does not make sense. We must therefore describe the addition law using 
algebra, as follows. [3 pg 1 0] 
PI if p2 = 00 
p2 if Pj=OO 
oo if xi= x2 and Ti f-.Y2 
oo if xi = x2 and .Yl = T2 = 0 
Otherwise, Pt EEl P2 = P3 = (x3,y3), where 
b -i 2 -i - x·1 - x2 -- a + 117 a , 
-Ti + 117(xi- X'3) 
and 
117 6~2-xJ(x·2- x·J-1 if Pi f.P2 
(3ax/ + 2b.x·i + c)2-1yii if Pi= P2 
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Here Xi, yi, mE G. If G = 7l.p, then every non-zero element of G has an inverse, because p 
is prime; we assume that p f:. 2 so that the term 2-1 in the last formula makes sense. 
[3 pg11] 
We use additive notation, rather than the usual multiplicative notation, for the group E(F); 
for example, we write P EB Q instead of PQ, we write - P rather than P -1 for the inverse of 
P, and call - P the negative or additive inverse of P. We also write nP instead of pn for n 
an integer. [3 pg 12] 
1.4 The Discrete Logarithm Problem with Elliptic Curves 
The group G = E(F) is not cyclic in general; that is, there is not necessarily an element 
P E E(F) that generates every element of the group by repeated addition to itself. Let P E G 
be a point on the curve, and let G' k G be the set {00 , ±P, ±2P, ±3P, ... }. The Elliptic Curve 
Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is still considered difficult when IG'I has large order. 
The ECDLP describes the problem of finding x in the equation 
Q=xP 
where Q E G' k E(F), P E E(F) and XE~. 
1.5 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(Eqn 1.6) 
Many public-key cryptosystems based on group operations in 71../ can be modified to use 
the addition law in E(F). For example, the El Gamal cryptosystem [8] is a public-key 
cryptosystem that relies on the difficulty of the DLP in a finite field (usually 7l.p for large 
prime p). El Gamal can be directly applied to Elliptic Curves by selecting an appropriate 
cyclic subgroup of the set of points on the curve. 
El Gamal cryptosystem comparison: Suppose Bob wants to send secure messages to 
Alice, so that only Alice can decrypt the message. 
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llp* 
cyclic group G of order q, generator yEG 
Alice's private key is a E {0,1 ,2, ... ,q-1} 
Alice computes A:=y" 
Her public keyl is (G,q,y,A) 
Bob takes plaintext mEG. He takes random bE{O, 1 , ... ,q-1} 
calculates c1:= yb and cz:=mN 
sends (c1,cz) to Alice 
Alice performs the calculation 
m 
For example: 
Working in ::l11* with generator 3, Alice chooses random 
a=12. She computes A= 312 mod 17 = 4. Her public key is 
now (G,q,y,A) = (::l11*, 16, 3, 4) 
(although in the case of G=::lp*, q is implied and does not 
need to be made public) 
Bob takes plaintext m=10, and chooses random b=11. He 
calculates 
c1 = 311 mod 17 = 7 
and 
c2 = 10.411 mod 17 = 10.13 mod 17 = 11 
and sends (c1, Cz) to Alice. 
Alice computes cJ.Ct' = c2(c/')" 1 mod 17 
= 11.13"1 mod 17 
= 11.4 mod 17 
= 10=m 0 
"Her public key ... " Note that in both cases, a complete 
list of elements in G and E are not required; only a 
description of the group and the group operation are 
required for the public key. For example, "G=2p*, with 
the standard modular arithmetic", "E is the curve 
y2 = x3 + 4x2 + 4x + 3, with the standard elliptic curve 
addition law". 
E(G) 
abelian group E(IP') for some field IJD, group not necessarily 
cyclic but has a cyclic subgroup G of "large" order q, with 
generator yEG 
Alice's private key is a E {0, 1 ,2, ... ,q-1} 
Alice computes A:=ay=yEByEByEE ... EEy, a times 
Her public key is (E,q,y,A) 
Bob takes plaintext mEG. He takes random bE{O, 1 , ... ,q-1} 
calculates c1:=by and cz:=mEBbA 
sends (c1,cz) to Alice 
Alice performs the calculation 
c2EB(-acJ (mEBbA)EE(-ab r) 
mEEba rEB(-ab r) 
m 
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Section Two: Pollard's rho-Algorithm 
· Pollard's rho algorithm [7] is a method for solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem. It has a 
runtime of O(.VIGI), which means the amount of processor time required to run the 
algorithm is less than or equal to some constant k multiplied by .VIGI. This is the same 
runtime as that of Shanks' Baby-Step Giant-Step algorithm [1 pp214-217] for finding the 
index in the DLP, but the rho algorithm requires constant storage (i.e. 0(1 )). This makes 
Pollard's rho algorithm much more space-efficient than Shanks' algorithm, which requires 
O(.VI Gl) storage. We will cover the storage requirements for Pollard's algorithm in more 
depth in the next section. 
2.1 Algorithm Description 
Recall that the DLP is solving the equation y" = a mod p (Eqn 1.1) for x. We define 
Pollard's rho-algorithm in the following way (based heavily on Buchmann's description of 
the algorithm [1 pp217-221]). Let G be a finite cyclic group of known order n, and yEG be a 
generator for this group. Define G1, Gz, G3 to be three pairwise disjoint subsets of G such 
that G1 u Gz u G3 = G; for example divide G into three subsets of roughly equal size. 
2.1.1 The r>-Algorithm 
Define the function f: G-+ G by the piecewise expression 
Y~ if~ E G1 
f(~):= ~2 if ~ E G2 
<X~ if~ E G3 
We choose a random number Xo in the set {1 , ... ,n} and compute the group element 
~o = yx_o_ We then compute the recursive sequence (~i)i<:o 
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The elements of this sequence can be written as 
i ?:_ 0. 
We define X; and y; recursively in a similar manner to our function f: 
.-r·1 + 1 mod n if~,. E G1 
X,+J = 2x·1 modn if~,. E G2 
X· I if~,. E c3 
and 
]li if~,. E G1 
)~1+1 = 2_y,. nwd n if~,. E G2 
.Y1+ 1 modn if~,. E G3 
where Xo is the initial random number and Yo =0. 
2.1.2 Proof of the ~-Algorithm Recursive Definitions 
Buchmann does not explain why ~ can be expressed in terms of x and y, but the proof is 
fairly straightforward. From the definition off( f3) and since ~o = yx-0 , then every ~;will be of 
the form yx_icxy_;. Then, to derive our recursive definitions of X; and y;, consider the three 
cases ~; EG1, ~; EG2, ~; EG3. 
Case 1: ~~ EG1 
Then ~1+1 = f(~J = y~,. 
but ~1+1 = yr.Ji+l) cx.)'_(i+l) 
:. x 1+1 = x·1 + 1 mod n, 
Case 2: ~~ EG2 
Then ~1+1 = f(~J = ~~ 
but a.. - y.l.·_{i+ 1) <X:y_(i+ 1) f-11+1-
:. x·,+1 = 2x1 mod n, 
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Case 3: ~,. EG3 
Then ~i+l = f (~) = (){~; 
b t a 1.+ 1 = yJ.·_(i+l) cx.di+l) ll- 1--' 
:. x;+J =X; mod n, }'i+I = y~· + 1 mod n 
2. 1.3 Computing The Index From The (3 Match 
Since we are working in a finite group, two elements in the sequence (~;);;;,o must be equal; 
that is, there exists i ~ 0 and k ~ 1 with ~i+k = ~;.This implies 
r i r i y-<X-
=> yr_i · .r_(i+A) 
=> yr_i · .r_(i+k) 
=> y'·_i · .r_(i+k) 
=> X;- Xi+k 
:r (i+A) r fi+k) y - (){· _, 
(){ y_(i+A). y_i 
(yjr-(i+k) ·.u 
ycf.r_{i+k) · y_ij 
x(J~·,.+~,.- .Y) mod n 
(by Eqn 1.1) 
(Eqn 2.1) 
(see [1) Corollary 2.9.3 for proof that this step 
works in an abelian group) 
We now have a congruence equation that we can solve for x, and thus solve the Discrete 
Log Problem (Eqn 1.1 ). The solution is unique mod n if Yi - Yi+k is invertible mod n. If the 
solution is not unique, we test the different possibilities for x to see which satisfies Eqn 1.1; 
if this is computationally impractical (if there are too many possibilities), then the algorithm 
is applied again with a different initial Xo. 
Buchmann's description of the algorithm does not include how to find the possibilities for x; 
he only shows the process by example ( [1] Example 10.4.1). Following is a general-case 
description of the process by which we find all the possibilities for x. 
Calculate g:= gcd(yi- Yi+k, n). If g divides X;- X;+k, then Eqn 2.1 has a unique solution mod 
nlg. If g does not divide X;- Xi+k, retry the algorithm with a different initial Xo. To find the 
index x, we solve the congruence 
(Eqn 2.2) 
for z. Then the possibilities for x are the g solutions to the equation 
z + k. (t1lg) , 0 -::::_ k -::::_ g mod n 
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2.2 Storage Requirements - The One-Triplet Method 
Note that if every triplet (~i, Xi, Yi) is stored, the algorithm requires 0(-11 Gl) storage. It is 
possible however to store only one triplet, and still guarantee a match is found. 
We store our initial triplet (~o, Xo, Yo). Now suppose the triplet Ti = (~i, Xi, Yi) is stored. Then 
we compute, compare with Ti, and discard every triplet between (~i+1, Xi+1, Yi+1) and 
(~2i-1, X2i-1, Y2i-1), stopping if a match is found and storing the final matching triplets. If no 
match is found, we discard Ti, compute and store T2i, and repeat the compute-and-
compare process. Fig 2.3 is an example of the stored triplets (using the same y, ()(, p and 
Xo values as Buchmann's Example 1 0.4.1, but computed with the algorithm in Appendix). 
>> pollardZ(5,3,2017,1023) 
B_j x_j y_j 
0 986 1023 0 
1 2 30 0 
2 10 31 0 
4 250 33 0 
8 1366 136 1 
16 1490 277 8 
32 613 447 155 
64 1476 1766 1000 
98 1476 966 1128 
(Fig 2.3) 
So we see that only triplets with i=2.e for some .e s 7l are stored, and a match is found at 
i=98 between i=26 and i=27 . A proof that a match occurs and will be found using this 
method of storing one triplet at a time, will be in the next section. 
Section Three: Why The rho-Algorithm Works 
3.1 (3 Match Guaranteed 
The Pollard rho-Algorithm will always find a match: since we are computing an infinite 
sequence of ~i values, all of which are elements of a finite group, there will definitely be a 
match. Moreover, we need only O(i.YGI) sequence elements to make the probability for a 
match greater than % (This can be shown by using the so-called "birthday paradox" - see 
Buchmann [1 pp118-119] for a proof). 
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3.2 Proof of One-Triplet Method 
This algorithm will always find a match even with the storage modification (Section 2.2). 
The proof of this involves two parts: firstly we show that the sequence (~i),::;:o is periodic 
after a match occurs, and secondly we show that we can still guarantee that a match is 
found when we only store one triplet at a time. 
Proof that the sequence is periodic: 
Let ~s = ~s+k be the first match, which is not necessarily found using the one-triplet method. 
Then ~s+1 = ~s+k+1 since the recursive construction of ~i+1 depends only on ~i, and similarly 
~s+11 = ~s+k+11 for some integer .e;::: 0. Thus the sequence is periodic after /3 s, and we see 
why the algorithm is called the 'rho' algorithm - the 'tail' of the rho is the sequence ~o, 
~1, ... ,~s-1, and the 'loop' of the rho is the periodic sequence ~s. ~s+1, ... ,~s+k-1· Ill 
Proof that the match will be found using Buchmann's one-triplet method: 
If i = 2 11 < s then no match is found; we replace i = 2 11 with i = 2 11 +1• If i = 2 11 ;::: s then ~i is in 
the periodic part of the sequence (~i),::;:o. If i = 211 ;::: k (recall that k is the length of the period) 
then the sequence 
~i+1 ' ~i+2 ' ... ' ~2i 
is at least as long as the period, so one if its elements will match ~i = ~2i· Now recall that 
after we store the triplet containing ~i = ~2•11, we compute this same sequence and 
compare its elements with ~i; hence a match will be found using this method of storage. Ill 
3.3 Remarks on One-Triplet Method and (!,-Algorithm 
At this stage it is worth noting that our one-triplet method will not necessarily find the first 
occurrence of a match in the sequence (~i),::;:o. Our assertion is that this does not affect the 
final result x, nor does it significantly affect the runtime of the algorithm. This is based on 
results rather than a formal proof; the algorithm returns the correct index x with the one-
triplet method, and finishes reasonably quickly. 
In fact, it is very interesting that while writing the code for pollardZ.m (Appendix), even 
though the ~-algorithm (Section 2.1.1) initially did not work (due to incorrect code it 
returned an incorrect sequence of triplets after the initial triplet), the correct index was still 
returned. When using the values from Buchmann's Example 1 0.4.1, the correct value of z 
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in Eqn 2.2 was also returned. 
The following data is taken from a diary file that recorded some early code test-runs: 
pollardZ(5,3,2017,1023) 
B_j x_j y_j 
0 986 1023 0 
1 10 31 0 
2 50 32 0 
4 1250 34 0 
8 64 136 2 
16 436 277 9 
32 1048 448 155 
64 394 1766 1001 
98 394 966 1129 
ans = 
1030 
(Fig 3.1) 
Comparing this to Fig 2.3 (the correct list of triplets), we see that every triplet after the 
initial triplet is wrong; and yet, the algorithm finds a match in the same number of iterations 
(namely, i=98), and the final answer is correct, namely x=1030. 
The reason for the error in the code is that the counter for the iterative beta algorithm was 
at the end of the loop instead of the beginning; the result being that the second triplet was 
computed but not stored, then the third triplet was stored as the second triplet and the 
error compounded. 
This warrants further research as to how the ~-algorithm can be varied without affecting 
the results, with applications to making the ~-algorithm more efficient. This will also be 
covered briefly in the next section. 
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Section Four: Pollard rho-Algorithm and Elliptic Curves 
Now we look at how Pollard's rho algorithm can be applied to solving the Discrete 
Logarithm Problem in Elliptic Curves. Several issues arise when trying to do this. For 
example, how do we define the three subsets G1, G2 and G3? If we have to store them 
explicitly (as lists of elements) we might as well solve the DLP by enumeration, and the 
storage requirement for the subsets will be O(n). When using the rho algorithm in 7lp, we 
only need to store the two 'dividing points', lh.p and 2h.p rounded to the nearest integer. 
Can we choose the subsets arbitrarily? What effect will different choices for the subsets 
have on the efficiency of the algorithm? We know that in the general case some care must 
be taken when choosing the subsets, for example 1 Et:G2. Are there any more cases, 
specific to elliptic curves, that will prevent success or slow the algorithm? 
Another issue is that the arithmetic with the exponents Xi and Yi is performed mod n, where 
n is the order of the group. In practice, how do we known for the elliptic curve E(F)? 
The following is taken and adapted from Menezes' paper [5] on Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography: 
If we assume that a 1 MIPS (Million Instructions Per Second) machine can perform 4 x 104 
elliptic curve additions per second; this is a conservative estimate. The number of elliptic 
curve additions (steps) that can be performed by a 1 MIPS machine in one year is roughly 
240. 
Let n be the order of a cyclic subgroup G' k E(F). Fig 4.1 shows, for various values of n, 
the computing power required to compute a single discrete logarithm using the Pollard rho-
method. A MIPS year is equivalent to the computational power of a computer that is rated 
at 1 MIPS and utilized for one year. 
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Field size (in bits) Size of n (in bits) Estimated number of steps MIPS years 
163 160 280 9.6 X 1011 
191 186 293 7.9 X 1015 
239 234 2117 1.6 X 1023 
359 354 2177 1.5 X 1041 
431 426 2213 1.0 X 1Q52 
Computing power required to compute elliptic curve logarithms with the Pollard 
rho-method. 
Fig. 4.1 
Conclusion 
There is much more to applying Pollard's rho-algorithm to Elliptic Curves than the time 
constraints on this project allow us to cover. Further research is required. 
There are more efficient versions of the Pollard rho-algorithm. See Menezes' reference 
[4 pg1 06) to Floyd's cyclefinding algorithm, as an alternative to our one-triplet method. 
Teske [9] experimented with different iterating functions - alternatives to our function fin 
section 2.1.1 - and found a function which significantly improved the runtime of the rho-
algorithm. In 1999 van Oorschot and Wiener [1 0] showed how Pollard's rho algorithm can 
be parallelized so that when the algorithm is run in parallel on n processors, the expected 
runtime of the algorithm is reduced by roughly n times; according to Menezes [6 pg9], in 
2001 parallelized Pollard's rho-algorithm was the fastest known general-purpose method 
for solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem. 
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Appendix 
This appendix contains MATLAB code for algorithms used in my research to compute 
examples in the report. The first four are small function algorithms that the fifth and final 
algorithm, pollardZ.m, invokes while finding the index x in the DLP (Section 1.1 ). 
invmod.m code written by Hamish Silverwood 
Algorithm for calculating the inverse of an element mod m 
function [X) = invmod(a, m) 
%Check relative primality 
if gcd(a,m)-=1 
error( 'a and m must be coprime (gcd(f,m)=1) for a to be invertible in Zm') 
end 
%Initiate variables 
xO=a; yO=m; MO=[ 1 0 0 1]; i=O; yN=1; 
while yN-=0 
qN=floor ( xO/yO); 
xN=yO; 
yN=xO-qN*yO; 
MN=[M0(3) M0(4) (M0(1)-qN*M0(3)) (M0(2)-qN*M0(4))]; 
end 
xO=xN; 
yO=yN; 
MO=MN; 
%Check for negatives 
if MN( 1 )<0 
X=m+MN(1); 
else 
X=MN(1); 
end 
return 
iseven.m code written by Hamish Silverwood, modified by Stephen McConnachie 
Algorithm returns 'true' if integer is even, 'false' otherwise 
function result = iseven(x) 
if mod(x,2)==0 
result=1; 
return 
elseif mod(x,2)==1 
result=O; 
return 
else 
error( 'Must have integer input') 
end 
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modexp.m code written by Hamish Silverwood 
Fast Exponentiation Algorithm, computes xe mod m 
function result = modexp(x 1 e 1 m) 
Y=l; 
while e-=0 
end 
if iseven(e) 
x = mod ( ( x A 2 ) 1 m) ; 
e = e/2; 
elseif -iseven(e) 
end 
Y mod( (x*Y) 1 m); 
e = e-1; 
result Y; 
ispwr2.m code written by Stephen McConnachie 
Algorithm returns 'true' if y = 2£ for some .e £ ~ 
function [x]=ispwr2(y) 
if y<O 
error( 'Input must be a non-negative integer') 
end 
aflag=O; 
while aflag==O 
end 
if y==2 
x=l; 
aflag=l; 
return 
elseif y==O 
x=O; 
aflag=l; 
return 
elseif y==l 
x=l; 
aflag=l; 
return 
elseif iseven(y)==l 
y=y/2; 
elseif iseven(y)==O 
x=O; 
aflag=l; 
return 
end 
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pollardZ.m code written by Stephen McConnachie 
Algorithm implements Pollard's rho-Algorithm for solving DLP in 7lp 
function [x) = pollardZ(g,a,p,xO) 
%Check number of input variables is valid 
if nargin==3 
n=p-1; %the order of a primitive element in Z~p (a generator for Z_p) is p-1 
%If only 3 input variables, generate random xO 
xi=ceil(rand*n); 
elseif nargin==4 
n=p-1; %the order of a primitive element in Z_p (a generator for z_p) is p-1 
xi=xO; 
else error('Incorrect number of input arguments. Calling sequence:(x] 
(g,a,p,xO) or [x) pollardZ (g,a,p) ') 
end 
%Check input variables are valid 
if g>n II g<O 
error('Input variable g must be an element of Z_p') 
elseif a>n I I a<O 
error('Input variable a must be an element of Z_p') 
elseif p<1 
error ('Input variable p must be greater than 0') 
elseif -isprime(p) 
error('p must be prime') 
elseif xi>n I I xi<1 
error('Input variable xO must be an element of N_n') 
end 
%Define subsets G1, G2, G3 
GlGZ=round(n/3); G2G3=round(2*n/3); 
y=O; aflag=O; jj=l; tol=O.l; 
while aflag==O 
B=modexp(g,xi,p); 
store=[B xi y]; 
pollardZ 
ii=O; %Set a counter value that increases by 1 with each iteration of the 
%beta algorithm 
disp(' j B_j x_j y_j') 
fprintf( '%3.0f %4.0f %4.0f %4.0f\n' ,ii,store) 
bflag=O; 
while bflag==O 
ii=ii+l; %increase counter value by 1 
%Define piecewise function (if loop) for recursive definition of x i 
if B<=G1G2 
else 
end 
xi=mod(xi+1,n); 
if B<=G2G3 
xi=mod(2*xi,n); 
end 
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%Define piecewise function (if loop) for recursive definition of 
if B>G2G3 
else 
end 
y=mod(y+l,n); 
if B>G1G2 
y=mod ( 2 *y, n) ; 
elseif abs(y)<tol 
y=O; 
end 
%Define in terms of and y __ i 
B=mod(modexp(g,xi,p)*modexp(a,y,p),p); 
%Check for match with stored triplet 
if B==store(l) 
bflag=l; store=[store xi y]; 
fprintf('%3.0f %4.0f %4.0£ %4.0£\n' ,ii,B,store(4),store(S)) 
break 
elseif ispwr2(ii)==l % ... store one triplet I eight triplets 
store=[B xi y]; fprintf( '%3.0£ %4.0£ %4.0f %4.0£\n' ,ii,store) 
end 
end 
x_i=store(2); 
x_ik=store(4); 
xd=x_i-x_ik; 
y_i=store(3); 
y_ik=store(S); 
yd=y_ik-y_i; 
gyn=gcd(yd,n); 
if gyn==l 
x=mod(xd*invmod(yd,n),n); 
aflag=l; 
else 
divtest=mod(xd,gyn); 
if divtest-=0 
error( 'Cannot compute index with this algorithm - gcd does not divide 
xi-xik') 
end 
if gyn<2A32 
nn=n/gyn; yy=yd/gyn; xx=xd/gyn; yyinv=invmod(yy,nn); 
z=mod(yyinv*xx,nn); 
for k=O:gyn 
x=z+k*nn; 
a_=modexp(g,x,p); 
if a ==a 
aflag=l; 
break 
19 
end 
end %if loop checking correct a generated by k 
end %for loop testing each k 
end %if loop preventing excessive algorithm runtime 
end %if loop calculating index 
if aflag==O 
end 
if nargin==4 
else 
end 
error( 'Runtime error: bad xO value. Enter different xO value, or increase 
tolerance in pollardZ.m line 131 "if gyn<2'32"') 
jj=jj+1; 
if jj==lOO 
error( 'Too many iterations in index algorithm. Try increasing tolerance') 
else xi=ceil(rand*n); y=O; 
continue %skip back to beta algorithm 
end 
%End of Script File: pollardZ.m 
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